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ARTICLES
DEAD OR ALIVE? THE LAW, POLICY, AND MARKET
EFFECTS OF LEGISLATION ON UNCLAIMED
LIFE INSURANCE BENEFITS
JAMES M. CARSON, ROBERT E. HOYT, AND TIM R. SAMPLES*
ABSTRACT
A wave of multi-state audits on the insurance industry’s use of the Social
Security Administration’s Death Master File (DMF) stirred national con-
troversy over the status of unclaimed life insurance proceeds.  Multi-state
investigations uncovered “asymmetric” use of the DMF among many large
insurance companies.  Accusations of unethical behavior led to numerous
settlement agreements between state regulators and insurers.  Payouts and
fines stemming from these settlements already number in the billions of
dollars.
Legislative responses are also underway.  Some states have adopted—and
others are considering—legislation requiring life insurers to search the
DMF to identify and pay (or eascheat) unclaimed death benefits.  Cur-
rently, legislative responses vary among the states, underscoring the long-
standing tension between uniformity and state-centric regulation of
insurance in the United States.  Some states have imposed DMF search
requirements on a prospective basis.  Others have attempted to apply such
requirements on a retroactive basis, affecting both new and existing
policies.
Emerging legislation on unclaimed life insurance has significant implica-
tions for consumers, insurance markets, and even state finances.  This
Article focuses on the crucial question of retroactive versus prospective
applicability of legislation on unclaimed life insurance benefits.  In consid-
ering the financial implications and legal dimensions of this question, this
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Article concludes in favor of prospective applicability.  Though presumably
well intentioned, the downsides of retroactive legislation on unclaimed life
insurance benefits outweigh the upsides.
INTRODUCTION
Insurers pay out tens of billions on life insurance policies each
year, distributing over $62 billion for claims in 2011 alone. 1  But, what
happens to the money when life insurance policies go unclaimed?  In
2008, this question led various state treasurers to audit insurance indus-
try use of the Social Security Administration’s Death Master File
(DMF)2 to identify and pay unclaimed benefits.3  In the course of these
audits, state treasurers identified “asymmetric” use of the DMF by some
insurers.4  Asymmetric use involves using the DMF to terminate pay-
ments on annuity policies of deceased contract holders while neglect-
ing to use the DMF to locate potential payouts on life insurance
policies.5  Accusations of impropriety stirred a national controversy.6  A
slew of multi-million dollar settlement agreements between insurers
and state regulators followed.7
Subsequent court decisions8 have ruled that insurers are not
required—absent legislation or contractual obligations to the con-
trary—to search external databases to discover obligations to pay or
“escheat” life insurance benefits to the states.9  But, payouts required
1. News Release, American Council of Life Insurers, ACLI On Unclaimed Life
Insurance Benefits (Mar.  21, 2013), https://www.acli.com/Newsroom/News%20Relea
ses/Pages/NR13-008.aspx?PF=true&Pub=false.
2. See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Social Security Death Master File, https://
www.ssdmf.com/ (establishing the DMF to create a master list of deceased persons, the Social
Security Administration wanted to prevent fraud and verify death records).
3. See, e.g., Press Release, Controller Betty T. Yee , Cal. St. Controller’s Office, Chi-
ang Sues Life Insurance Company for Violating Unclaimed Property Law (May 7, 2013),
http://www.sco.ca.gov/eo_pressrel_13429.html (describing audits undertaken in
California).
4. See Devin Hartley, Note, A Billion Dollar Problem: The Insurance Industry’s Widespread
Failure to Escheat Unclaimed Death Benefits to the States, 19 CONN.  INS.  L.J. 363, 368–70
(2013).
5. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company’s Practices and Procedures Relating to the Use of the
Death Master File Data and Related Information: Hearing Before Ins.  Comm’r of the State of Cal., 6
(Cal.  2011) [hereinafter California Metlife Hearing] (statement by California Insurance
Commissioner Dave Jones that “[s]ome insurers appear to use the [DMF] to cut off pay-
ments on annuities when an annuity owner dies, but do not use that information to iden-
tify life insurance policyholders who die and pay their beneficiaries.”).
6. See Leslie Scism & Vauhini Vara, Life Insurers Skimp on Payouts: States, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487033670045762894237
32099868.
7. See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, MetLife Settles Cases on Benefits, N.Y.  TIMES (Apr.  23,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/24/health/policy/metlife-settles-cases-on-ben-
efits.html (reporting on various Metlife settlements); see also infra Part I.A (providing
details on DMF settlement agreements).
8. See cases cited infra note 91.
9. Escheat, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed.  2009) (generally is the “[r]eversion of
property (esp.  real property) to the state upon the death of an owner who has neither a
will nor any legal heirs.”).
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under settlement agreements already exceed $7.4 billion dollars.10  As
of 2015, over twenty mostly large life insurers, comprising more than
70% of the United States life insurance market (as measured by pre-
mium volume) had entered into settlements with state treasurers and
state insurance regulators.11  In these settlements, insurers voluntarily
agreed to check the DMF for deceased insureds to mirror the practice
of checking for deceased annuitants—and to escheat any unclaimed
death benefits identified through that process.12
Legislative responses in several states followed as well, some of
which are still underway.13  Public responses to the unclaimed life
insurance benefits controversy underscore tensions between state regu-
lation and market uniformity, which have a long history in the insur-
ance industry.14  Among the states, regulatory and legislative responses
have been uneven thus far.15  The scope of applicability—namely, retro-
active versus prospective—of the legislation is especially key.16  While
some states have opted for prospective-only application (i.e., applying
to policies issued on or after the effective date of legislation), others
have opted for retroactive application (i.e., applying to all policies
regardless of when issued).17  Meanwhile, some statutes are silent on
the question.18
The outcome of public responses to the unclaimed life insurance
benefits controversy has timely and relevant implications for consumers
10. See Leslie Scism, Why Decades-Old Life-Insurance Benefits May Still Go Unpaid, WALL
ST.  J. (Feb.  26, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/why-decades-old-life-insurance-ben-
efits-may-still-go-unpaid-1456507761 (reporting that the 22 largest insurers in the United
States have paid over $7.4 billion to beneficiaries and state unclaimed property accounts).
11. Press Release, Cal.  Dep’t of Ins., Two Additional Insurers Agree to Appropriate
Use of Death Master File (Mar.  23, 2015), http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/
0100-press-releases/2015/release031-16.cfm (explaining that in the insurance context, a
premium is the amount of money that an individual or business pays to maintain an
insurance policy).
12. See, e.g., Press Release, Cal.  Dep’t of Ins., “Death Master” Investigation Results
in National Settlement With Major Life Insurer (Feb.  2, 2012), http://www.insurance.ca
.gov/0400-news/0100-press-releases/2012/release010-12.cfm (summarizing and provid-
ing link to Regulatory Settlement Agreement between several state insurance depart-
ments and Prudential).
13. See legislation cited infra p. 11 and notes 56–57. R
14. See Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism
and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA.  ST.  U.  L.  REV. 625, 630
(1999).
15. See Stephen L.  Poe, Insurance Regulations and Unclaimed Property: A Dilemma for
Life Insurers, 7 SOUTHERN J. OF BUS.  & ETHICS 160, 165 (2015) (describing differences in
regulatory responses among states); see also infra Part I.B.
16. In this context, we consider “retroactive” to mean the application of new laws
that affect the legal status of past behavior that was undertaken before the existence of
the new law. See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S.  244, 269–70 (1994) (stating
that “the court must ask whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to
events completed before its enactment”).
17. See infra Part I.B (illustrating various approaches among states on the applicabil-
ity question).
18. Id.
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and insurance markets alike.19  Another key policy issue is the role of
unclaimed property in state finances.20  As cash-strapped states seek
new sources of funding, unclaimed property has become increasingly
important as a source of revenue.21  Though this trend has been partic-
ularly critical in the wake of the Great Recession, the practice of states
seeking revenue by asserting jurisdiction over unclaimed life insurance
has a fairly long history in the United States.22  Accordingly, we con-
sider the fiscal implications of retroactive versus prospective legislation
on unclaimed life benefits.
Lawmakers, courts, and regulators now face important questions
concerning implementation, ranging from the scope of applicability to
more technical DMF search requirements.  This Article focuses on the
specific and critical question of retroactive versus prospective applicability.
Namely, should DMF search requirements apply retroactively to both
past and future policies, or should they apply prospectively to future
policies only?  On one hand, this question raises important legal ques-
tions about the fairness and legality of retroactive legislation.23  On the
other hand, the applicability question involves financial consequences
for insurance markets and consumer interests alike.24  In addressing
these issues, this Article contributes an analysis of empirical and legal
questions to the ongoing debate over appropriate responses to the
insurance industry’s unclaimed benefits controversy.
Our findings suggest that the downsides of retroactive applica-
tion—while presumably well intentioned—outweigh the upsides for
consumers and insurance markets alike.  However, we do believe it is
reasonable to require insurers to comply with DMF search require-
ments on a prospective basis.  A prospective-only approach would allow
insurers to implement adequate data collection practices in line with
19. See Randall, supra note 14, at 627 citing German Alliance Ins.  Co. v. Lewis, 233
U.S.  389, 411–15 (1914) (noting deep connections between consumer interests and
insurance business); see also Part III (explaining implications of emerging legislation for
insurance markets and consumers).
20. See Sean M.  Diamond, Comment, Unwrapping Escheat: Unclaimed Property Laws
and Gift Cards, 60 EMORY L.J. 971, 973 (2011) (describing the practice among states of
raising revenue through unclaimed property laws as an alternative to raising taxes); see
also William S.  King, Note, A Bridge Too Far: Due Process Considerations in State Unclaimed-
Property Law Enforcement, 45 SUFFOLK U.  L.  REV.  1249, 1249 (“[S]tates have looked toward
new sources—unclaimed property, in particular—to find much needed cash.”).
21. See Teagan J.  Gregory, Note, Unclaimed Property and Due Process: Justifying “Reve-
nue Raising” Modern Escheat, 110 MICH.  L.  REV. 319, 319 (2011) (“In the face of increas-
ing fiscal challenges, states have worked to increase their collection of unclaimed
property via new escheat legislation that appears to bear little or no relation to protecting
the interests of owners.”).
22. See, e.g., H.C., Note, Jurisdiction to Escheat Abandoned Life Insurance Policies, 35 VA.
L.  REV. 336, 336 (1949) (addressing issues of jurisdiction over life insurance policies for
states “[i]n their search for new sources of revenue”).
23. Compare Daniel E. Troy, Toward a Definition and Critique of Retroactivity, 51 ALA.
L.  REV. 1329, 1332 (2000) (distinguishing among justifiable and unjustifiable retroactive
laws), with Bernard W.  Bell, In Defense of Retroactive Laws, 78 TEX.  L.  REV. 235, 239–41
(1999) (reviewing DANIEL E.  TROY, RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION (1998)) (critiquing Troy’s
arguments).
24. See DANIEL E.  TROY, RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION 22 (1998).
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the unique requirements of DMF searches.25  We believe that prospec-
tive applicability would allow all insurers, but especially medium and
smaller insurers, to adjust to these requirements without problematic
disruptions to insurance markets or significant adverse impacts on con-
sumers.  Prospective applicability also stands on firmer legal ground,
particularly where legislation is silent on the question of retroactive
applicability.26
This Article is organized as follows: Part I provides details on regu-
latory and legislative responses to the unclaimed life insurance contro-
versy, including settlement agreements with state regulators, existing
and emerging state legislation, and other relevant state laws.  An assess-
ment of competitiveness and market concentration in the insurance
industry in Part II finds that insurance markets in the United States are
highly competitive, which has important benefits for consumers.  Spe-
cific consequences of retroactive legislation are addressed in Part III.
Then, in Part IV, we consider the implications of legislation on
unclaimed life insurance benefits for state revenues.
I. THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
Following the DMF controversy, litigation and settlement agree-
ments have reshaped the legal and regulatory environment for insur-
ance markets.  Accordingly, this Part begins with an overview of
regulatory responses (i.e., audits and settlement agreements with state
regulators) and legislative responses (i.e., state legislation on unclaimed
life insurance benefits).  This Part then discusses the state-centric
approach to insurance regulation in the United States.  As a result of
this regulatory dispersion, responses among the states have been une-
ven, reflecting tensions between the state-centric approach and uni-
formity in insurance regulation.  Next, this Part addresses legal and
policy arguments related to the retroactivity of legislative responses to
unclaimed life insurance.  And, finally, this Part explains the role of
unclaimed property laws and life insurance contracts in the unclaimed
life benefits debate.
A. Settlement Agreements
After audits on DMF practices in the insurance industry ignited a
national controversy, as many as forty insurance companies were
accused of asymmetric practices.27  Strongly worded statements about
asymmetric practices cast much of the insurance industry in a harsh
25. See Poe, supra note 15, at 167–69 (discussing problems associated with reliance
on DMF for unclaimed life benefits searches); see also infra Part III.F.
26. See infra p. 12-13 and notes 63–74 (discussing legal constraints on retroactive R
legislation).
27. Cyril Tuohy, Jackson National, Axa Settle Death Master File Suit, INSURANCENEW-
SNET (Jan.  11, 2016), http://insurancenewsnet.com/innarticle/2016/01/11/two-more-
carriers-settle-dmf-dispute-bringing-total-to-24.html. For an explanation of the meaning of
“asymmetric” practices in this context, see supra note 5 and accompanying text. R
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light.28  While many insurance companies were found by regulators to
be using the DMF appropriately,29 this episode is arguably one of the
most contentious in the history of insurance regulation in the United
States.30  The outcome of the public response to these issues has impor-
tant implications for state finances, consumers, and life insurance mar-
kets alike.31  Although the percentage of death benefits that goes
unclaimed is quite small—approximately 1% according to industry esti-
mates—the volume of unclaimed benefits easily exceeds one billion
dollars.32  Unclaimed property assets, including life insurance benefits,
are playing an increasingly important fiscal role for many state
governments.33
In 2011, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) established a Task Force to review payment practices on life
insurance benefits, including the asymmetric use of the DMF.34  Pri-
mary goals of this Task Force included coordinating the multi-state reg-
ulatory response and conducting hearings on life insurance payment
practices.35  A broad regulatory response encompassed over thirty states
and numerous insurance companies, including the largest insurers in
the United States.36  Regulators from California, Connecticut, Illinois,
Michigan, Florida, New York, Iowa, North Dakota, New Hampshire, and
Pennsylvania led the investigations.37  However, much of the auditing
was handled with the assistance of specialized auditing firms formed
specifically to target this area of the insurance industry.38  The role and
28. See, e.g., Press Release, Controller Betty T.  Yee, Cal.  St.  Controller’s Office,
Controller Chiang, Insurance Commissioner Jones Announce Settlement With AIG Insur-
ance (Oct.  22, 2012), http://www.sco.ca.gov/eo_pressrel_12705.html (“For decades, too
many insurers have fleeced their policyholders. . .”); see also Zachary Tracer, Transamerica
Among Insurers in $763 Million Settlement, BLOOMBERG (June 7, 2013, 5:29 PM), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-06-07/transamerica-among-insurers-in-763-mil-
lion-settlement (quoting California Controller’s statement that “[t]oo often, insurers have
sidestepped their legal responsibility to make good on insurance policies purchased by
their clients”).
29. See, e.g., Press Release, Fla.  Office of Ins.  Reg., Multistate Report Finds USAA
Used the Death Master File (DMF) Appropriately (Feb.  10, 2014), http://www.floir
.com/pressreleases/viewmediarelease.aspx?id=2051.
30. Mary Jo Hudson & Jill Murphey, Am. Council of Life Insurers, Life Insurance,
Unclaimed Property and the Death Master File: Toward a Uniform National Framework 3 (3d ed.
2016) (“These issues have become some of the most contentious in the history of life
insurance regulation in the United States.”).
31. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text.
32. See California Metlife Hearing, supra note 5, at 77–78; see also infra p. 28-29 and R
notes 187–189. R
33. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IV. R
34. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS.  COMM’RS, Regulators to Review Life Insurance Payment Prac-
tices (May 17, 2011), http://www.naic.org/Releases/2011_docs/regulators_review_life_
payment_practices.htm.
35. Id.
36. See Tuohy, supra note 27.
37. Id.
38. See Poe, supra note 15, at 165 (explaining the role of auditors).
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fee structure of the firms carrying out audits of the insurers on behalf of
the states has attracted some controversy as well.39
A wave of settlement agreements followed the audits and the Task
Force investigations.40  By 2015, over twenty mostly large life insurers,
comprising nearly 70% of the United States life insurance market (as
measured by premium volume) had entered into settlements with state
treasurers and state insurance regulators.41  In addition to fines and
interest penalties, many of the settlement agreements required insurers
to escheat unclaimed life benefits worth hundreds of millions of dollars
into state unclaimed property accounts.42  Other obligations for the sig-
natory companies in the settlement agreements include requirements
for periodic DMF searches, timelines for payments on future benefits,
and various compliance measures.43  Below, Table 1 identifies settle-
ment agreements entered into by insurance companies with unclaimed
property regulators and insurance regulators in various states.44
39. See, e.g., King, supra note 20, at 1257–60, 1262–65; see also MAEVE O’CONNOR ET
AL., U.S.  CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, Land Rush!: The Latest Legal Frontier of
Unclaimed Property Enforcement and Litigation 16–17 (Oct.  2012), http://www.instituteforle
galreform.com/uploads/sites/1/Uncaimed_Property_Paper.pdf.
40. See, e.g., CAL. ST. CONTROLLER, Protecting Life Insurance Beneficiaries, http://www
.sco.ca.gov/protecting_life_insurance_beneficiaries.html (listing and providing links to
settlement agreements between the California State Controller and various insurance
companies).
41. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
42. See Tracer, supra note 28.
43. See Poe, supra note 15, at 164–65 (describing obligations of insurers under set-
tlement agreements); Michelle Dicks et al., Recent Developments in Insurance Regulation, 48
TORT TRIAL & INSURANCE PRACTICE L.J. 305, 316–18 (2012).
44. Table 1 includes fines and interest payable by insurers under settlement agree-
ments, but not the value of unclaimed benefits escheated to states and/or beneficiaries.
For some companies, specific amounts are not available. For instance, the Hartford and
Western & Southern settlements were reported at $18 million and $165 million, respec-
tively, which includes not only fines and interest but also escheatment obligations. See
Tracer, supra note 27. Likewise, Northwestern Mutual was part of a massive multi-state
and multi-insurer settlement worth $763 million nationwide but the specific amounts
paid by Northwestern are unknown at this time. See Press Release, Cal. St. Controller Betty
T.  Yee, Cal. St. Controller’s Office, Controller Reaches Settlements with Transamerica,
New York Life and 9 Others (June 7, 2013), http://www.sco.ca.gov/eo_pressrel_13539
.html.
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TABLE 1: SETTLEMENTS BETWEEN INSURERS AND STATE REGULATORS
Insurer Date Amount*
John Hancock (FL) May 2011 $3 million
John Hancock (CA) Nov.  2012 $15 million
Prudential Jan.  2012 $17 million
MetLife Apr.  2012 $40 million
Forethought Oct.  2012 $25 million
Nationwide Oct.  2012 $7.2 million
AIG Oct.  2012 $11 million
Lincoln National and affiliates Nov.  2013 $13.2 million
TIAA-CREF June 2013 $6.2 million
ING Aug.  2013 $10.7 million
Transamerica Sep.  2013 $11.2 million
Genworth Dec.  2013 $1.9 million
Pacific Life Mar.  2015 $2.45 million
New York Life Oct.  2013 $15 million
Symetra Nov.  2014 $1.2 million
Midland Nat’l & North American Co. Nov.  2013 $3.3 million
Aviva Nov.  2013 $4 million
Sun Life Nov.  2014 $3.2 million
Allianz Dec.  2014 $4.7 million
Guardian Life Mar.  2015 $2 million
Axa Dec.  2015 $3.3 million
Jackson National Dec.  2015 $2.5 million
* These settlement amounts do not include the value of unclaimed benefits escheated to state
unclaimed property accounts, which are often much larger in volume.
B. The NCOIL Model Act and State Legislation
In the midst of the NAIC Task Force investigation and the ongoing
settlements, the National Conference of Insurance Legislators
(NCOIL) proposed model legislation in 2011 to address the issues sur-
rounding unclaimed death benefits.45  The NCOIL Model Act, known
as the “Unclaimed Life Insurance Benefits Act,” is based in part on the
settlements that were reached through the NAIC Task Force.46  Amend-
ments were introduced to the NCOIL Model Act in 2012, including an
important adjustment in DMF search requirements from quarterly to
semiannual frequency.47  In 2014, the NCOIL Model Act was revised
again by the NAIC Task Force following further consultation and
input.48  As further explained below, these more recent revisions again
included changes to DMF search requirements, but left the retroactive
application in place.49
45. See NCOIL MODEL UNCLAIMED LIFE INSURANCE BENEFITS ACT (Nov.  17, 2011),
http://ncoil.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/2011-Annual-Report-MeetingonUn
claimedBenefitsMinutes.pdf.
46. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS.  COMM’RS, supra note 34.
47. See Dicks et al., supra note 43, at 320.
48. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS.  COMM’RS, Unclaimed Life Insurance Benefits (a) Working
Group (Mar.  28, 2015), http://www.naic.org/meetings1503/committees_a_unclaimed_
life_benefits_wg_2015_spring_nm_materials. pdf [hereinafter NCOIL MODEL ACT 2014].
49. Id.
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In terms of search requirements, the current version of the NCOIL
Model Act requires life insurers to regularly (at least twice per year)
compare the insurer’s in-force life insurance policies against the DMF
(or other similar databases).50  Following verified matches of insurer
data with the DMF, insurers would then either pay death benefits to
beneficiaries identified through this process or escheat those death
benefits to states as unclaimed property.51  The NCOIL Model Act is
retroactive in that it can be read to apply to not only new, but also to
existing life insurance policies, annuity contracts, and retained asset
accounts.52  If the insurer detects a possible match between the
insured’s name, date of birth and/or Social Security Number and a per-
son listed in the DMF, the NCOIL Model Act requires the insurer to
take steps to confirm the death of the insured through other available
information and to locate and contact the beneficiary within ninety
days of a match.53  For some beneficiaries, however, insurers lack
address information and will have to develop processes for attempting
to locate these beneficiaries.54  That is particularly true of older policies
with imperfect data.55
Twenty-three states have already enacted legislation on unclaimed
life insurance benefits.56  Others—including Massachusetts, New Jersey,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina—are currently consider-
ing legislation.57  As illustrated in Table 2, while some state legislation is
explicitly prospective, many statutes are silent on the question of appli-
cability.58  In some states, regulators have taken the position that the
50. Id.
51. See infra Part I.D (discussing unclaimed property laws and escheatment obliga-
tions in the life insurance context).
52. NCOIL MODEL ACT 2014, supra note 48, § 3 (defining various insurance
products).
53. NCOIL MODEL ACT 2014, supra note 48, § 4.
54. See Part III.A (discussing limitations of data quality in older policies).
55. Id.
56. States with legislation that is prospective in application include Alabama, Arkan-
sas, Georgia, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Utah. ALA.  CODE
§ 27-15-51 (2013); ARK.  CODE ANN. § 23-81-904 (West 2015); GA.  CODE ANN. § 33-25-14
(West 2014); MISS.  CODE ANN. § 83-7-307 (West 2014); N.M.  STAT. § 59A-16, N.C.  GEN.
STAT.  ANN. § 58-58-390 (West 2015); TENN.  CODE ANN. § 56-7-3404 (West 2015); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 31A-22-1903 (West 2015).  States with legislation that is explicitly retroactive
include Florida and West Virginia. FLA.  STAT. § 717.107 (2016), W.  VA.  CODE § 33-13D
(2016).  States with legislation that is silent on the question of retroactive or prospective
application include Idaho, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Montana, Nevada,
New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Vermont. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-3002
(West 2016), 215 ILCS 185 (2016), IND.  CODE ANN. § 27-2-23-11 (West 2015), IOWA CODE
§ 556.3 (West 2013), KY.  REV.  STAT.  ANN. § 304.15-420 (West 2014), MD.  CODE ANN.,
INS. § 16-118 (West 2014), MONT.  CODE ANN. § 33-20-1605 (West 2014), NEV.  REV.
STAT.  ANN. § 688D.090 (2014), N.Y.  INS. § 3240 (McKinney 2014), N.D.  CENT.  CODE,
§ 26.1-55-02 (2013), R.I.  GEN.  LAWS § 27-80-4 (West 2014), VT.  STAT.  ANN. tit.
27, § 1244a (West 2015).
57. See, e.g., Keane’s Unclaimed Property Blog, KEANE http://unclaimed-prop-
erty.keaneco.com/ (last visited Sept.  9, 2016) (providing updates on unclaimed life
insurance benefits legislation).
58. See supra note 56.
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legislation should apply retroactively.59  Another key issue that varies
across states is the DMF search methodology required by various stat-
utes.60  This is especially important for small and mid-sized insurance
companies because the search and matching process can be resource-
intensive.61  Additionally, as explained later in this Article, the accuracy
of the DMF presents considerable limitations.62
TABLE 2: STATE LEGISLATION ON UNCLAIMED LIFE INSURANCE BENEFITS
State Date Prospective Silent** Retroactive
Alabama May 2012 X
Arkansas June 2015 X
Florida Apr.  2016 X
Georgia Apr.  2014 X
Idaho July 2015 X
Indiana Mar.  2014 X
Iowa May 2014 X
Illinois Aug.  2016 X
Kentucky Apr.  2014 X ^
Maryland May 2012 X ^
Mississippi Mar.  2014 X
Missouri June 2016 X
Montana Mar.  2013 X
Nevada June 2013 X
New Mexico* Apr.  2013 X
New York Dec.  2012 X
North Carolina* Oct.  2015 X
North Dakota Apr.  2013 X
Rhode Island June 2014 X
Tennessee* May 2014 X
Utah* July 2015 X
Vermont May 2013 X
West Virginia Apr.  2016 X
Notes:  * Four states (New Mexico, North Caroline, Tennessee, and Utah) have adopted
prospective legislation that also requires retroactive application for those insurers who
have asymmetrically used the DMF.
** Where the NCOIL Model Act is silent, the language typically states that the law applies
to all “in-force” policies, leading some state regulators to believe the Act applies
retroactively.
^ Insurance regulators have taken the position that the NCOIL statute applies
retroactively.
59. For an example of litigation in Kentucky courts that addressed the question of
retroactivity, see infra notes 75–79. R
60. Memorandum from Matt Holman, Counsel, Neb. Dep’t of Ins. to Unclaimed
Benefits Model Drafting (A) Subgroup (June 23, 2015), http://www.naic.org/docu-
ments/committees_a_unclaimed_benefits_sg_150626_nebraska_doi_memorandum.pdf.
61. See Part III.F (discussing implications of DMF search requirements for medium
and small-size insurers).
62. See Poe, supra note 15, at 167–69 (addressing limitations of the DMF); see also
infra Part III.F.
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Presumptions against retroactive legislation are rooted in the Fed-
eral Constitution.  Some restrictions on retroactive government actions
are expressly provided in the Constitution, such as the Ex Post Facto
Clause, the Contract Clause, the Takings Clause, and the Bills of Attain-
der Clause.63  In Landgraf v. Usi Film Prods., the Supreme Court made
clear that Congress is constrained by a presumption that legislation
applies prospectively unless retroactive intent is clearly stated.64 Lan-
dgraf also reinforced the point that retroactive legislation touches fun-
damental notions of due process and fair notice.65  Similar approaches
are taken to statutory construction among the states.66
From an economic standpoint, retroactive legislation can have neg-
ative consequences for investments made based on settled expecta-
tions.67  Certainty and predictability—in legal and regulatory
environments as well as in contracts—are critical factors in business
decisions.68  The importance of legal certainty to commerce has a long
history in American political thinking.69 But, on the issue of retroactiv-
ity, the distinction between civil legislation and criminal legislation is
critical.70  While a restrictive approach to retroactive criminal legisla-
tion has remained intact, the post-Lochner71 era has seen permissive
treatment of retroactive civil legislation.72  As a result, state legislatures
have relatively few constraints when it comes to enacting retroactive
63. Landgraf v.  Usi Film Prods., 511 U.S.  244, 267 n.20 (1994). The Ex Post Facto
Clause, for instance, flatly prohibits retroactive applicability in criminal legislation.
64. Id. at 268.
65. Id. at 265 (“[T]he presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted
in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic.
Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity
to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations
should not be lightly disrupted.”).
66. See, e.g., Myers v. Philip Morris Cos., 50 P.3d 751, 759 (Cal.  2002) (“California
courts apply the same ‘general prospectivity principle’ as the United States Supreme
Court.”); Majewski v. Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 696 N.E.2d 978, 980 (N.Y.
1998) (referring to New York’s “strong presumption of prospectivity”); infra note 78 and R
accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text. R
68. See Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, Robert C.  Bird & Helena Haapio, Promoting Busi-
ness Success Through Contract Visualization, 17 J.  L.  BUS.  & ETHICS 55, 58–62 (2011) (artic-
ulating the importance of legal certainty and predictability in business decisions); see also
Troy, supra note 23, at 21 (explaining economic arguments against retroactivity).
69. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO.  62, at 317–318 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed.,
2009) (“What prudent merchant will hazard his fortunes in any new branch of commerce
when he knows not but that his plans may be rendered unlawful before they can be exe-
cuted? What farmer or manufacturer will lay himself out for the encouragement given to
any particular cultivation or establishment, when he can have no assurance that his pre-
paratory labors and advances will not render him a victim to an inconstant
government?”).
70. Harold J.  Krent, The Puzzling Boundary Between Criminal and Civil Retroactive Law-
making, 84 GEO.  L.J. 2143, 2146–52 (1996) (describing the distinction as a “sharp
contrast”).
71. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
72. Charles Tiefer, Did Eastern Enterprises Send Enterprise Responsibility South?, 51
ALA L.  REV. 1305 (2000) (describing constitutional tolerance of policy-based civil retro-
activity since Lochner).
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state legislation.73  But the law generally requires a clear expression of
retroactive intent in legislation.74
For reasons elaborated throughout this Article, the question of ret-
roactive versus prospective applicability in legislation on unclaimed life
insurance benefits is a crucial issue.  This question was confronted
directly in Kentucky courts after insurance regulators sought to apply
the state’s Unclaimed Life Insurance Benefits Act retroactively.75  Ini-
tially, a Kentucky trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Department of Insurance, finding that the Act did not violate the rule
against retroactive application.76  On appeal, the appellate court
reversed the trial court, finding that retroactive application of the Act
was improper.77  Statutory construction in Kentucky provides that stat-
utes operate prospectively, unless “it is absolutely certain” that retroac-
tive application was intended by the legislature.78  Finding that the
presumption against retroactivity sufficient to rule against retroactive
application of the Act, the appellate court did not rule on the constitu-
tional issues raised by the appeal.79
C. State Regulation of Insurance Contracts
Formal regulation of the insurance industry by the states took root
as early as the mid-1800s.80  Among financial services, the regulation of
the insurance industry is something of an outlier.81  Still today, insur-
ance regulation remains the domain of the states.82  Accordingly, life
insurers and life insurance contracts are primarily regulated by the
states rather than the federal government.83  Beginning with Paul v.
Virginia,84 which established state supremacy over insurance regulation,
the Supreme Court has maintained that insurance regulation is not
73. Jeffrey Omar Usman, Constitutional Constraints on Retroactive Civil Legislation: The
Hollow Promises of the Federal Constitution and Unrealized Potential of State Constitutions, 14
NEV. L.J. 63, 78 (2013).
74. See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 268 (1994).
75. United Ins. Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, No.  2013-CA-000612-MR, 2014 Ky.
App.  LEXIS 139, at *8 (Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2014).
76. Id. at 5–6.
77. Id. at 7.
78. Id. at 7.
79. Id. at 11.
80. Randall, supra note 14, at 630.
81. Id. at 629 (“Insurance is unique among financial services in that it is regulated
by the states.”).
82. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945:
Reconceiving the Federal Role in Insurance Regulation, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 14–15 (1993)
(“Among major financial institutions in the United States, only insurance firms are sub-
ject to plenary state regulation.”).
83. See Robert F. Weber, Combating the Teleological Drift of Life Insurance Solvency Regu-
lation: The Case for a Meta-Risk Management Approach to Principles-Based Reserving, 8 BERKELEY
BUS. L.J. 35, 39 nn.2–3 (2011) (specifying exemptions in federal regulation for insurers);
see also Feingold v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co. (USA), 753 F.3d 55, 62 (1st Cir. 2014).
84. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1869).
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within the purview of federal oversight.85  Coordinated efforts among
state insurance commissioners—namely, through the NAIC—have
given rise to a roughly uniform legal and regulatory landscape for the
insurance industry, though tensions between state-centric system and
uniformity persist.86
Life insurance contracts long have contained regulator-approved
language that the insurer will investigate and pay a claim upon receipt
of proof of death.87  Life insurance contracts generally require the per-
formance of certain acts, such as premium payments and proof of
death, as conditions precedent to the insurer’s obligation to pay.88  The
requirement for proof of death is well established in the business of life
insurance for both operational and public policy reasons.89  In some
states, this practice has been codified by statute.90
These contractual terms imply an obligation on the part of the
beneficiary or insured’s estate to initiate the claims process.  In other
words, the responsibility for initiating the process for a death claim lies
not with the insurer but with the beneficiary or the insured’s estate.
Under state insurance laws, and as a matter of contract, insurers histori-
cally have not had an affirmative duty to investigate whether an insured
has died.91  A number of recent court decisions have confirmed that
insurers have no obligation to affirmatively search for evidence of an
insured’s death, including by performing searches of the DMF.92
Clearly the incentive to file a death claim lies with the beneficiary,
which stands in contrast to the lack of incentive to notify the insurer to
cease annuity income with respect to an annuity.93  Once a claim has
been filed, life insurance contracts include language that the insurer
will pay interest on the proceeds.94  Some states mandate that the
85. See Randall, supra note 13, at 631 (describing Supreme Court decisions on the
question of federal regulation of insurance and noting the failure of an attempt to amend
the Constitution to permit federal regulation of insurance).
86. Id. at 630.
87. See, e.g., United Ins. Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, No. 2013-CA-000612-MR,
2014 Ky. App. LEXIS 139, at *8 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2014).
88. KENNETH BLACK JR. & HAROLD D. SKIPPER JR., LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE 191,
204–05 (13th ed. 2000) (“[T]he insurer’s obligation to pay a claim depends upon the
performance of certain acts, such as payment of premiums and furnishing proof of
death.”).
89. Id. (“Life insurance policies understandably require ‘due proof’ of the insured’s
death before paying the face amount.”).
90. See, e.g., Thrivent Fin. v. Florida, 145 So. 3d 178, 180–181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
Aug. 5, 2014) (citing statutory language that life insurance claims shall be made once the
insurer receives due proof of death).
91. See, e.g., Feingold v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co. (USA), 753 F.3d 55, 61 n.6 (1st
Cir. 2014); Thrivent Fin., 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 11923 at 182; Total Asset Recovery Servs. v.
Metlife, Inc., No. 27-CV-11-2113, 2012 Minn. Dist. LEXIS 92, at *4 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec.
31, 2012); Andrews v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 2012 WL 5289946, at *1 n.1, *4 (Ohio Ct.
App. Oct. 25, 2012); State ex rel. Perdue v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., No. 12-C-287, slip op.
at 14 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Dec. 27, 2013).
92. See cases cited supra note 91.
93. See infra Part III.B.
94. JAMES S. TRIESCHMANN, ROBERT E. HOYT & DAVID W. SOMMER, RISK MANAGEMENT
AND INSURANCE Appendix D-11 (12th ed. 2005).
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insurer pay interest from the date when a claim is filed to the date the
claim is paid, if that period exceeds thirty days.95  Other states provide
for the payment of interest from the date the insured died until the
claim is paid.96  Thus, once a death claim is filed, it is generally in the
insurer’s interest to promptly pay.97
For the purposes of unclaimed benefits, the mortality limiting age
is the age at which the applicable mortality table assumes death
occurs.98  If no claim is made and the life insurance policy remains in
force when the insured attains the mortality limiting age, the insurer
then is required either to pay the policy proceeds to the insured or the
beneficiary, or to hold the funds with accumulated interest.99  Gener-
ally speaking, the mortality limiting age is established by statute or is
mandated by state insurance departments.100
As discussed in this section, the insurer is obligated to pay a claim
following the performance of certain acts by the policyowner (or the
beneficiary or estate), such as payment of premiums and furnishing
proof of death.101  Additionally, the requirement for proof of death is
well established.102  These expectations are well settled and longstand-
ing.103  Retroactive requirements to search the DMF for evidence of
death of an insured among the insurer’s entire book of policies would
clearly be activity that was not anticipated at the time the policies were
underwritten, priced, and issued.  Thus, legislation requiring retroac-
tive DMF searching would have adverse impacts on the financial
strength of insurers and the insurer’s policyholders and/or
shareholders.
95. Such states include Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Wisconsin. AMERI-
CAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, ACLI LAW SURVEY: PAYMENT OF INTEREST ON LIFE INSUR-
ANCE DEATH CLAIMS 2–9 (2008), https://www.acli.com/Events/Documents/718fbcfecad9
42c9af78191e456d5344Fri072409IndustryResourcesTipsandTricksforUndersta.pdf.
96. Id.  Such states include California, Colorado, and New Hampshire.
97. In Re: Nationwide Insurance Company: Hearing Before the Florida Office of Insurance
Regulation, 42 (2011) (statement of Eric Henderson, Senior Vice President of Individual
Investments, Nationwide Life Insurance Company) (“[A]ctually if you just go for pure
financial interest, it’s in our interest to [escheat unclaimed insurance benefits] so we
don’t have [to pay] that statutory interest.”).
98. This mortality limiting age in most cash value policies has traditionally been age
100.  In more recently issued policies the age may be higher, often age 120. See Aubrey




100. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 33-10-13 (2016) (setting insurance tables); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 33-7-9 (2014) (setting insurance tables).
101. See supra text accompanying notes 87–90. R
102. See supra text accompanying notes 88–91. R
103. See supra text accompanying notes 87–90. R
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\31-1\NDE101.txt unknown Seq: 15 12-JUL-17 12:47
2017] DEAD OR ALIVE? 15
D. Unclaimed Property Laws
Like insurance regulation, unclaimed property law has been left to
the states.104  But most states have adopted a version of uniform legisla-
tion on unclaimed property, which emerged in the 1950s to resolve
divergence and confusion among the states.105  After the wide adoption
of this uniform legislation, unclaimed property laws only vary slightly
from state-to-state.106  Generally speaking, unclaimed property laws in
the United States are custodial in nature, meaning that the state holds
the unclaimed property in perpetuity until the rightful owner makes a
claim of ownership.107  Modern escheat laws provide that the state is
entitled to take title in or take custody of unclaimed property that is
presumed abandoned.108
Consistent with insurance regulation and insurance contract terms,
state unclaimed property laws (e.g., Arkansas) historically have pro-
vided that life insurers have an obligation to escheat policy proceeds
either where death benefits are unclaimed after the insurer receives
proof of death or where the insured has attained the mortality limiting
age but cannot be located.109  That is, unclaimed life insurance pro-
ceeds do not stay with insurers indefinitely.110  Some state unclaimed
property laws (e.g., Virginia) also require escheatment where the
insurer learns of an insured’s death even though the insurer did not
receive a claim and proof of death from the beneficiary.111
Property escheated to the state does not become titled property of
the state.112  That is, unclaimed property laws generally are “custodial”
in the sense that the state takes custody of unclaimed property that has
been escheated to the state until the property is claimed (if ever) by the
rightful owner.113  Unclaimed property laws typically allow states to use
a portion of the funds held in state unclaimed property accounts, so
104. King, supra note 20, at 1256.
105. See Diamond, supra note 20, at 980–81 (citing uniform unclaimed property
acts and discussing their historical context).
106. Id. at 981.  Most states have adopted model legislation on unclaimed property.
107. See Susan T. Kelly, Note, Unclaimed Billions: Federal Encroachment on State Rights
in Abandoned Property, 33 B.C. L. REV. 1037, 1043 (1992).
108. Id. at 1037.
109. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-28-202 (2015).
110. See, e.g., Paul Sullivan, Tracking Down and Collecting Unclaimed Life Insurance,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/26/your-money/life-and-
disability-insurance/26wealth.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
111. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-210.4:01 (1984).
112. King, supra note 20, at 1250.
113. See, e.g., Fong v. Westly, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 76, 84 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (“Under
the Unclaimed Property Law, property received by the state cannot permanently escheat
to the state.  No unconstitutional taking occurs where a state exercises its right to take
custody of abandoned property, as opposed to taking absolute title.” (citation omitted));
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 829 P.2d 964, 971 (Okla. 1992) (Finding the
unclaimed property act is not an escheat statute, but a “‘custodial taking law[ ]’ which
make[s] the State custodian of proceeds . . . whose owners are unknown or cannot be
located, subject to the claims of those who prove ownership or a prior right to
possession.”).
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long as the state maintains adequate funds to satisfy claims of the right-
ful property owners who may appear.114
Increasingly, unclaimed property accounts comprise a significant
role in the fiscal picture of state governments.115  As noted in a report
of the Legislative Analyst’s Office, unclaimed property is the fifth-larg-
est revenue source for the California General Fund.116  Most states do
not pay interest on the funds held in unclaimed property accounts.  For
example, California stopped paying interest in 2003 on the value of
unclaimed property in possession of the state.117  Some states, however
(e.g., Virginia), pay interest if the property would be interest bearing in
the custody of the holder.118  While state laws vary with respect to the
payment of interest on unclaimed property, insurers do pay interest on
life insurance proceeds.119  Thus, beneficiaries can be disadvantaged by
escheat when an insurance company would owe statutory interest from
date of death because most states, like California, do not pay interest on
escheated funds.120
II. COMPETITION AND INSURANCE MARKETS
Regulators and consumers rely on the competitive nature of the
insurance market to help keep prices relatively low.  Competition in the
insurance market contributes to better prices and products being avail-
able to consumers.121  Competition forces insurers to charge prices that
closely match the costs they face.  In life insurance this not only
includes core costs like mortality charges, but also costs imposed by reg-
ulation.  Factors that threaten the ability of small and medium-sized
insurers to continue operating or lead to consolidation in the industry
can result in fewer insurers and less competition.
Therefore, it is important to understand the competitive landscape
of the insurance industry.  In assessing the competitiveness of a market,
Vaughan and Vaughan indicate that economists typically focus on mar-
114. See, e.g., Morris v. Chiang, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 799, 802, (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“The
purpose[ ] of the [Unclaimed Property Law is] to protect the owners of unclaimed prop-
erty . . . and ‘to give the state rather than the holders of unclaimed property the benefit of
the use of it . . . .’”) (quoting Harris v. Westly, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 343, 346 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004)); Clark v. Strayhorn, 184 S.W.3d 906, 910 (Tex. App. 2006) (“[T]he unclaimed
property act creates a mechanism for individuals to reclaim their lost property but
empowers [Texas] to use abandoned property for the benefit of the State until a claim of
ownership has been asserted.”).
115. See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IV. R
116. MAC TAYLOR, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, UNCLAIMED PROPERTY: RETHINKING
THE STATE’S LOST & FOUND PROGRAM 3 (2015), http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2015/
finance/Unclaimed-Property/unclaimed-property-021015.pdf.
117. Id. at 10.
118. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-210.21 (2016).
119. For a multi-state survey of state laws on the payment of interest on life insur-
ance claims, see AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, supra note 94.
120. See TAYLOR, supra note 116.
121. See ROBERT E. HOYT ET AL., AN EXAMINATION OF THE ROLE OF INSURANCE PRO-
DUCERS AND COMPENSATION IN THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 6–8 (2005), http://www.ibawest
.com/pdf/Articles/IIABAContigencyCommissions2006.pdf.
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ket structure and market conduct as measures of competition.122
According to their framework, important factors in assessing market
structure are the number of competitors and the percentage of the
market controlled by one or a few insurers.123  They suggest that mar-
ket conduct is reflected by the ease of entry and exit into the market
and changes in market share over time, which is also impacted by the
regulatory environment.124
What does the evidence suggest regarding the relative competitive-
ness of the life insurance market in the United States?  Perfect competi-
tion in the classical sense requires the following characteristics in the
marketplace: (1) many buyers and sellers; (2) perfect information; (3)
unrestricted entry and exit; and (4) a homogenous product.  However,
rarely does perfect competition exist.125  Even if all of these characteris-
tics are not fully met, a market can be viewed as competitive.126
A. Market Participants
In the United States, thousands of insurance companies compete
for business.127  While differences do exist between the exact products
offered by different insurers, a relatively homogenous set of insurance
products are offered by these insurers including term life, permanent
life, and annuities.  A number of insurers have been in business for well
over 100 years, but many insurers have formed in recent periods or
have entered new markets.  This confirms the relative ease of entry into
and exit from the insurance business as compared to firms in capital-
intensive industries like heavy manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, and
energy production.
Historically the life insurance industry overall has been a highly
competitive business, in terms of both the numbers of insurers and the
products, services, and prices they offer.  In 2012, more than 800 life
insurers were operating in the United States.128  The top ten insurers in
individual life insurance represent about 57% of the market, but the
remaining 43% of the life insurance market is distributed across a large
number of insurers of varying size.129  Many smaller and medium-sized
insurers continue to exist and thrive in the insurance marketplace,
adding substantial amounts of capacity to the market.  In turn, these
insurers help to increase competition, reduce prices, and increase avail-
ability of insurance to consumers.
122. EMMETT J. VAUGHAN & THERESE VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSUR-
ANCE 91 (8th ed. 1999).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See KENNETH BLACK, JR. ET AL., LIFE INSURANCE 10–14 (14th ed. 2013).
126. Id.
127. James M. Carson et al., Incentive Compensation and the Use of Contingent Commis-
sions: The Case of Smaller Distribution Channel Members, 25 J. INS. REG. 53, 54 (2007).
128. AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, LIFE INSURERS FACT BOOK 5 (2013),
https://www.acli.com/Tools/Industry%20Facts/Life%20Insurers%20Fact%20Book/Doc
uments/Life_Insurers_Fact_Book_2013_All.pdf.
129. See id. at 99.
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In terms of insurance buyers, data from the Life Insurance Market-
ing and Research Association (LIMRA) reveals that the life insurance
industry has been able to reach most United States citizens.  About 62%
of all people in the United States were covered by some type of life
insurance in 2013, according to LIMRA’s 2014 Insurance Barometer
Study.130
B. Market Share Characteristics
The second factor that Vaughan and Vaughan consider in assess-
ing the competitiveness of a market is the market share characteristics
and the level of concentration.131  A commonly accepted measure of
market concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI),
which is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm compet-
ing in a market, and then summing the resulting numbers.132  The
HHI number can range from close to zero to 10,000.133  In this context,
by any accepted measure the life insurance marketplace is a very com-
petitive one.  The United States Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission generally consider markets with HHI scores under
1,500 as unconcentrated.134  Unconcentrated markets are generally
viewed as being more competitive.  Based on data from A.M. Best for
the ordinary life insurance market, the concentration score (HHI) in
2013 was 450.135
Thus, while not all of the characteristics for perfect competition
are fully met in the insurance marketplace, most observers would con-
clude that the market for insurance is highly competitive.  Given the
value of competition to insurance consumers, it is important to con-
sider the impact of any regulatory actions on the competitiveness of the
insurance marketplace.136  In the next Part, we address implications of
retroactive DMF-search legislation on competition for insurance
markets.
III. RETROACTIVE DMF-SEARCH AND THE INSURANCE MARKETPLACE
“The rule of law, to summarize, is a defeasible entitlement of persons to have
their behavior governed by rules publicly fixed in advance.”137
130. ASHLEY V. DURHAM, LIFE INSURANCE MARKETING AND RESEARCH ASSOCIATION,
INSURANCE BAROMETER STUDY 3 (2014).
131. VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 122, at 91–92.
132. See, e.g., Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, Evaluating Market Power Using
Competitive Benchmark Prices Instead of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 74 ANTITRUST L.J.
387–88 (2007) (pointing out widespread reliance on the HHI by regulators in the United
States, the European Union, Australia, and New Zealand).
133. See Eli M. Noam, Deregulation and Market Concentration: An Analysis of Post-1996
Consolidations, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 539, 541 (2006).
134. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDE-
LINES 19 (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf.
135. A.M. BEST, 2014 STATISTICAL STUDY: U.S. ORDINARY LIFE 222–28 (2014).
136. See supra Part II.
137. Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of Retroactive Legislation, 61 TEX. L. REV. 425, 471
(1982).  Though boldly stated, this quote underscores connections between notice, pre-
dictability, and notions of fairness in the law.
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As discussed earlier, several states have enacted legislation that
requires insurers to search the DMF on a regular basis in order to iden-
tify deceased insureds with unclaimed death benefits.138  Given modern
technology, the costs of complying with these statutes are not unduly
burdensome for policies issued after the effective date of the new legis-
lation because insurers have much better data for these policies that is
readily accessible through modern electronic databases.  However, costs
of compliance for legislation that is applied retroactively on existing
policies would be significant, as explained in this Part.
In addition, such compliance costs were not contemplated in pric-
ing of these in-force policies.  For some policies with inadequate data,
compliance is especially challenging, or even impracticable.139  Thus,
while there seems to be general agreement that such legislation is rea-
sonable and appropriate on a prospective basis, the impact of legisla-
tion, if applied retroactively to existing (and especially older) policies, is
an area of concern due to its potential cost implications for insurers
and consumers.140  This Part addresses various issues related to the pro-
posed legislation on unclaimed death benefits, focusing particularly on
implications stemming from retroactive legislation in the context of the
insurance market.
A. Quality of Records on Existing Books of Policies
Understandably, many individuals are unaware of the data quality
challenges faced with existing books of mature policies held by insurers.
Prior to the early 1980s, most data processing was handled with the
standard IBM punch cards that often contained just eighty columns.  As
a result, only critical data fields were collected electronically, and in
many cases information was abbreviated.  Social security numbers were
not usually collected until after the mid-1980s.  Names were often
abbreviated, full birthdate information was not routinely entered, and
insurers often only captured the insured’s age at policy issue.  Prior to
the 1970s, many insurers relied heavily on paper records.  This pattern
was even more pronounced in smaller and medium-sized insurers due
to the high cost of data processing and data storage.  These normal
business practices of the past make data matching with the DMF for
older policies difficult, costly, and much more susceptible to errors.
B. Life Insurance versus Annuities
Some observers have commented on the asymmetric practice of
using the DMF to review benefits being paid on annuities but not doing
the same on life insurance for unclaimed death benefits.141  Whereas
life insurance pays benefits upon the death of the insured policyholder,
annuities are a financial contract that pays the holder on regular inter-
138. See supra Part I.B.
139. See Poe, supra note 15, at 164 (citing the difficulty of using DMF searches with-
out accurate social security numbers).
140. See O’CONNOR ET AL., supra note 39, at 3–7.
141. See, e.g., Hartley, supra note 4, at 379. R
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vals, typically for the rest of their life.142  Key differences between these
two financial products explained below are especially relevant.
First, contact information is readily available and recent for annu-
ity business that is in payout mode because regular checks are being
sent and collected, and the interaction with the claimant is recent and
ongoing.143  Differences in the tax treatment of annuities and life insur-
ance products have also contributed to contrasts in data collection prac-
tices.  Unlike annuities, which often involve the issuance of tax
documents, life insurance proceeds received as death benefits generally
are excluded from taxable income.144  As a result, data such as social
security numbers and addresses were historically more frequently and
consistently collected for annuity policies than for life insurance poli-
cies.145  In the case of life insurance, mature policies have data that is
much older, less accurate, and less complete, and contact with the poli-
cyholder is much less frequent.146
Second, annuities in payout, which some insurers searched against
the DMF, represented a much smaller portion of the book of business
than would be impacted by the proposed legislation on unclaimed
death benefits from life insurance policies.147  In life insurance,
searches are required of the entire book of business since every policy
on the insurer’s books would need to be evaluated.  This is much more
costly and more likely to result in false positives, especially for older
policies that would be included in legislation that is retroactive.148
Third, in the case of life insurance, money is held in trust by the
insurer pending notification that payment under the contract should
be made.149  In the case of annuities, payments are being made from
policyholder funds.  If insurers did not monitor the appropriateness of
continued payouts on annuities, not only would it encourage fraud, but
it would also be contrary to the interest of all policyholders and other
stakeholders of the insurer.150  It would lead to increased costs for all
other policyholders and would force the insurer to raise prices for its
products going forward.  Taking these differences into account, asym-
metrical use of the DMF for matches in annuities but not for life insur-
ance policies is not as unreasonable as it appears at first glance.
142. See BLACK, JR. ET AL., supra note 125, at 123.
143. See Poe, supra note 15, at 161.
144. See BLACK, JR. ET AL., supra note 125, at 544.
145. See Ed Leefeldt, ’Death Master’ Limits Life Insurance Companies’ Access to Death
Records, INSURE.COM (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.insure.com/life-insurance/ssa-limits-
death-records.html (quoting American Council of Life Insurers (ACLI) spokesperson
Whit Cornman statement that “Social Security numbers generally weren’t collected [by
insurers] decades ago, making matches much less reliable.  In contrast, insurers tend to
have up-to-date records of Social Security numbers for annuity buyers for tax reasons.”).
146. Id. (describing deficient data in old life policies and reasons for lack of contact
between policyholders and insurers).
147. As recently as 2013, annuities in payout represent approximately 5% of the
total book of business in force of United States insurers. See A.M. BEST, supra note135.
148. See Poe, supra note 15, at 164.
149. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text (citing relevant case law). R
150. L. Lee Colquitt & Robert E. Hoyt, An Empirical Analysis of the Nature and Cost of
Fraudulent Life Insurance Claims, 15 J. INS. REG. 451, 452, 477–78 (1997).
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C. Industrial Life Insurance and Small Face Value Policies
Insurers often specialize, focusing on different segments of con-
sumers.  While some insurers write primarily large face value policies,
others focus on providing coverage through policies with much smaller
face values.  Historically, many of the small face value life insurance pol-
icies were referred to as “industrial” life insurance.151  One insurance
textbook states that “industrial life, home service life, or debit insur-
ance, refers to a type of cash value life insurance that is sold in very
small amounts, primarily to meet the burial needs of low-income
insureds.”152  Due to insurance company financial reporting require-
ments, we are able to collect specific data on industrial life insurance.
However, the analysis provided here would apply equally to other forms
of small face value life insurance.  The same textbook further notes that
“because the face amount is so small, underwriting standards often are
fairly liberal, and medical exams are rarely required.”153  Similarly, the
limited underwriting requirements frequently resulted in relatively lim-
ited information being collected by the insurer at time of issue.154
In the 1960s, approximately ninety-eight million industrial life poli-
cies were in force, with approximately $41 billion in face amount of
coverage.155  In Metropolitan Life’s settlement with states, most of the
policies at issue in the multistate settlement were industrial life policies,
which MetLife stopped selling in the 1960s.156  Even today, however,
some insurers—most often small and medium-sized insurers—have
industrial life insurance as part of their overall book of business.  Also,
as noted above, a number of insurers continue to provide other small
face value life insurance to consumers.157  These categories of life insur-
ance products are important to many modest and low-income
consumers.158
While this line of insurance has continued to decline in signifi-
cance relative to new issues, a large number of very small policies
remain in force with insurers.  Based on data from A.M. Best, approxi-
mately twelve million industrial life insurance policies with a total face
amount of coverage of approximately $11 billion remain in force in
2014.159  The average policy face amount was $903 for industrial life,
which compares to an average policy face amount of $106,761 for ordi-
nary life insurance.160
151. See TRIESCHMANN ET AL., supra note 94, at 329.
152. Id. at 329–30.
153. Id. at 330.
154. See L. Lee Colquitt et al., Adverse Selection in the Credit Life Insurance Market, 31 J.
INS. REG. 157 (2012).
155. See Joseph M. Belth & E.J. Leverett, Jr., Industrial Life Insurance Prices, 32 J. RISK
& INS. 367 (1965).
156. See Walsh, supra note 7.
157. See Colquitt et al., supra note 154, at 172.
158. Id.
159. A.M. BEST, supra note 135, at 67. R
160. Id. at 51–52.
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From these figures, if we assume a relatively fixed cost per policy of
conducting a DMF search and verification process, this would mean
that it is roughly 100 times more costly per unit of coverage to comply
with retroactive requirements for industrial life insurance than for ordi-
nary life insurance.  Additionally, this cost estimate assumes that the
quality of records between industrial life and ordinary life are equal,
which of course is not the case.161  As a result, the cost multiple would
be even higher than 100 times for industrial life insurance.  Retroactive
requirements to search for evidence of death of an insured among the
insurer’s book of industrial life insurance or other small face value poli-
cies would clearly be activity that was not anticipated or legally required
at the time the policies were underwritten, priced, and issued.162  Legis-
lation requiring retroactive DMF searching would impact adversely on
policyholders and/or shareholders of these companies.
D. Price Sensitivity of the Demand for Insurance
Since insurance is often viewed as a necessity, or is required by law
or by other entities as part of financial transactions, the demand for
most insurance is relatively price inelastic.163  That is, the overall
demand for these products does not decline significantly when the
price increases.164  For the life insurance market, Browne and Kim esti-
mated the price elasticity for life insurance as -0.24.165  Their finding
suggests that demand for life insurance is relatively insensitive to
changes in price.  This means that a 10% increase in the price of life
insurance would lead to only a 2.4% decline in the demand for life
insurance.
So, what is the relevance of these findings for consumers in the
market for life insurance?  Competition means that insurers will be
forced to charge prices that reflect the cost of the product.  Also, it is
important to note that life insurance rates are not closely regulated.  As
stated by Rejda and McNamara, “[l]ife insurance rates are not directly
regulated by the states.  Rate adequacy is achieved by laws that require
legal reserves to be at least a minimum amount.”166  This prevents rates
from being set too low, but the states depend on market competition to
assure that rates are not set at excessive levels.  However, since the
NCOIL Model Act prohibits passing on the increased compliance costs
to existing customers in the form of premium increases, the costs neces-
sarily have to be passed on to future customers.  Moreover, these
increased costs necessarily will be significant because insurers not only
assume new administrative burdens, but the NCOIL Model Act acceler-
161. See Colquitt et al., supra note 154, at 158; see also Poe, supra note 14, at 161.
162. See Poe, supra note 15, at 161 (discussing data deficiencies in small policies).
163. See Robert E. Hoyt, The Effect of Insurance Fraud on the Economic System, 8 J. INS.
REG. 304, 308 (1990).
164. Id. at 307.
165. Mark J. Browne & Kihong Kim, An International Analysis of Life Insurance
Demand, 60 J. RISK & INS. 616, 628 (1993).
166. GEORGE E. REJDA & MICHAEL J. MCNAMARA, PRINCIPLES OF RISK MANAGEMENT
AND INSURANCE 150 (12th ed. 2014).
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ates the escheatment of death benefits that could not be paid to benefi-
ciaries which otherwise would be escheated at the mortality limiting
age.167
As discussed above, in a competitive market such as the insurance
market, all costs of doing business must be incorporated and these
added costs have to be borne by someone (shareholders, policyholders,
or future customers).  It is worth noting that in the ordinary life insur-
ance market, the majority of premiums are written by stock insurers,
with the remaining premium written by mutual and fraternal insur-
ers.168  So, for a significant part of the market, the owners are the poli-
cyholders and they will bear the compliance costs along with future
consumers.169  It is also important to note that for consumers with very
limited disposable income, who generally purchase industrial or small
face value policies, even small increases in premium may actually dis-
suade them from purchasing insurance at all.
E. Impact of Retroactivity on Small and Medium Insurers
The impact of requiring insurers to retroactively search the DMF
would be greatest on medium and smaller-size insurers.  These insurers
have less internal technology and personnel resources available to
address these requirements than large insurers.  While insurer records
are perfectly adequate to properly service policies, many insurers’
records, especially for medium and small-size insurers, are not adequate
to comply cost-effectively with a law that retroactively changes the
underlying insurance contract.  These insurers would be more likely to
require external consulting and analytics support to comply with these
requirements.  Due to their smaller size, the impact of these additional
costs on a per policy basis would be much higher.  This could result in
financial solvency issues or departure of these insurers from the mar-
ket.170  Loss of these insurers from the market would result in reduced
underwriting capacity, and the availability and price of coverage would
be adversely affected.  This impact would be most severe in local mar-
kets and for moderate and low-income consumers.
Consumers benefit from competition in the marketplace.171  In
the long run, competition generates better products and services at
lower prices.  An environment in which insurers of varying sizes can
compete results in consumers having more choices.  It also leads to
more insurers competing in the market place, and a competitive insur-
ance marketplace makes insurance relatively more available and more
affordable to millions of insurance consumers.172  Imposing costs that
disproportionately affect small and medium insurers is likely to have an
167. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text. R
168. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, supra note 128, at 1.
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., James M. Carson & Robert E. Hoyt, Life Insurer Financial Distress: Classi-
fication Models and Empirical Evidence, 62 J. RISK & INS. 764, 767 (1995); Mark J. Browne et
al., Dynamic Financial Models of Life Insurers, 5 N. AM. ACTUARIAL J. 11, 12–13 (2001).
171. See BLACK, JR. ET AL., supra note 125, at 10–12.
172. See HOYT ET AL., supra note 121, at 7.
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adverse impact on the level of competition in the insurance market.173
In insurance, “one-size doesn’t fit all.”  These added costs, especially for
medium and smaller insurers, will reduce profitability, cash flow, finan-
cial strength, solvency and/or return on capital.  As noted earlier, many
insurers are owned by their policyholders, and so legislation that nega-
tively impacts the insurance market ultimately also negatively impacts
insurance consumers as policyholders and as owners.174
F. Error Rates, Fuzzy Matching, and the DMF
The Social Security Administration’s DMF, created to assure that
Social Security checks would not be sent to people who had died, con-
tains over 80 million records.175  Errors in the data, such as incorrect
Social Security numbers, misspelled names, or erroneous birthdates,
are known to exist.176  These errors have been the subject of a wide
range of inquiries, from coverage on 60 Minutes to formal reports by the
United States Government Accountability Office.177  DMF errors would
have a material impact on insurers, particularly small and medium-sized
companies.  A review conducted by one modest-sized midwestern life
insurer exposed a significant incidence of false positive matching in
search results.178
Another report found that, of the roughly 2.8 million deaths
reported to the Social Security Administration and listed in the DMF
each year, approximately 14,000 entries per year were incorrect in that
the person listed was not actually dead.179  That the DMF is far from
error-free is well established.180  Less widely appreciated, but also criti-
cally important, are the practical difficulties of conducting DMF match-
ing with poor data quality.181  With low data quality, especially for
mature books of business with policies issued many years ago, false posi-
tive rates are significant.182
173. Id.
174. See supra notes 168–169 and accompanying text. R
175. See HUDSON & MURPHEY, supra note 30, at 12.
176. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE
DEATH MASTER FILE (2013) [hereinafter Testimony] (statement of Daniel Bertoni, Direc-
tor, Education, Workforce, and income Security Issues), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/
654411.pdf; Rae Ellen Bichell, Social Security Data Errors Can Turn People into the Living
Dead, NPR (Aug. 10, 2016, 5:01 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/
08/10/489318279/social-security-data-errors-can-turn-people-into-the-living-dead.
177. See CBS, Dead or Alive, 60 MINUTES (Mar. 15, 2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/social-security-identity-fraud-scott-pelley-60-minutes/; Testimony, supra note 175.
178. See NEB. DEP’T. OF INS., supra note 60.
179. See Blake Ellis, Social Security Wrongly Declares 14,000 People Dead Each Year, CNN
MONEY (Aug. 22, 2011, 1:41 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/17/pf/social_securi
ty_deaths_mistakes/index.htm.
180. See Michael Hiltzik, ‘60 Minutes’ Bungles Another Hit Piece on Social Security, L.A.
TIMES (Mar. 16, 2015, 12:26PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-60-
minutes-bungles-20150316-column.html (characterizing reports on DMF inaccuracies as
“a hardy journalistic perennial”, like reports on how bad the traffic is in your town or
sweeps-week TV pieces on gourmet restaurants flunking sanitary inspections”).
181. See supra Part III.A (describing the low data quality in older policies).
182. See, e.g., NEB. DEPT. OF INS., supra note 60.
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The challenges to matching insurer records with data in the DMF
are exponentially larger if combined with “fuzzy matching” criteria
whereby recognition of data quality issues in the DMF are addressed by
allowing for non-exact matches in order to expand the likelihood of
possible matches.  For example, instead of searching only on “James,”
an insurer also would search for “Jim,” “Jimmy,” and so on.  Likewise for
Social Security numbers, instead of searching for an exact match of all
nine digits, fuzzy matching would return a hit if at least seven or eight
digits matched.  The use of fuzzy matching vastly increases the number
of possible names, which then would have to be searched and verified
against the insurer’s records to see if an insured is dead or alive.
Thus, errors in the database imply that it is not as straightforward
in practice to simply search the DMF for matches to the insurer’s cus-
tomer data.  The erroneous entries in the DMF, especially when cou-
pled with fuzzy matching criteria as required by some states (e.g., New
York), significantly increase the search and verification costs for life
insurers seeking to comply with DMF-related legislation.  The burden of
these requirements is significantly higher for small and mid-sized insur-
ance companies.183  And costs would be even higher across the board if
legislation applies retroactively to older policies.
IV. DMF LEGISLATION AND STATE REVENUES
According to one estimate, over $40 billion of unclaimed property
is currently held by states.184  Unclaimed life insurance benefits are rel-
atively rare at just 1% of all policies.185  But, because insurers pay out
tens of billions in death benefits every year, the volume of unclaimed
benefits is considerable in the aggregate.186  One estimate placed the
approximate value of unclaimed life insurance transferred to the states
at $351 million in 2009.187  New York alone received about $400 million
in unclaimed life insurance property between 2000 and 2011.188  Mean-
while, as of 2011, Florida had approximately $355 million in unclaimed
life insurance in its accounts.189  These figures have grown as states
have increasingly looked to unclaimed property law as an alternative to
raising revenues through taxes.190  Unclaimed property is now the fifth-
largest revenue source for the California General Fund.191
183. See Scism, supra note 10 (explaining the contrasting economics of new statu-
tory requirements for smaller insurers versus the largest insurers).
184. See What Is Unclaimed Property, NAT’L ASS’N OF UNCLAIMED PROP. ADM’RS (last
visited Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.unclaimed.org/what/.
185. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. R
186. Insurers distributed over $62 billion in life insurance claims in 2011. See supra
note 1 and accompanying text. R
187. These figures are acknowledged as likely underestimating the total value. See
Sullivan, supra note 109 (citing a Joseph M. Belth study of the largest twenty insurance
companies and their activities in the twenty largest states).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See Diamond, supra note 20.
191. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. R
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Legislation requiring insurers to search the DMF to identify
unclaimed death benefits may accelerate the payment of funds to the
unclaimed property accounts of the states, but will not lead to finding
significant new funds.  Effectively, legislation will accelerate the escheat-
ment of unclaimed policy proceeds when the beneficiary does not make
a claim following the death of the insured.  In the absence of a death
claim, policy proceeds would otherwise escheat at the mortality limiting
age.192  As a result, states will benefit only to the extent that they obtain
custody of funds (and associated float) at an earlier date.193
To be sure, DMF-related settlements have resulted in significant
flows into unclaimed property accounts for some states.194  But most of
the low-hanging fruit has already been picked.  Our analysis leads us to
believe that states would be ill-advised to believe forecasts of sustained
revenue increases related to DMF-settlements or legislation.195  Many
insurers already have turned over unclaimed funds to state accounts
and beneficiaries.196  Since many of the largest insurers have already
reached settlements, the magnitude of the remaining recoveries is
rather limited.197  As a result, states have already received the bulk of
the escheated death benefits subject to acceleration by related DMF
legislation.
Specifically, as we point out earlier in this report, over twenty
mostly large life insurers, comprising more than 70% of the United
States life insurance market (as measured by premium volume), have
already voluntarily entered into settlement agreements as reflected in
Table 1.198  Payments due under those settlements represent all
unclaimed benefits due for several decades for deceased insureds and
the acceleration of amounts that previously would have been paid at
mortality limiting age.  But, at this point, those payments have already
have been made or will be paid by 2017.  Thus, legislation that requires
the remainder of the life insurance industry to perform additional DMF
matches to identify previously deceased insureds will very likely gener-
ate far smaller amounts of funds.
While there have been fiscal upsides for states associated with the
escheatment of unclaimed life insurance, benefits for consumers are
even less clear.  Of the property that states receive through escheat-
ment, state officials and consultants say that states typically return 25%
to 40% of the money they collect to owners.199  If a clear beneficiary
192. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text. R
193. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text.
194. See Walsh, supra note 7 (citing state officials’ estimate that payouts from three R
large insurance companies alone would eclipse one billion in the coming years).
195. See, e.g., VA. DEP’T OF PLANNING AND BUDGET, 2015 FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT:
UNCLAIMED PROPERTY; DEATH MASTER FILE, http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?
151+oth+SB1305FS1122+PDF.
196. See supra Part I.A.
197. See CAL. STATE CONTROLLER’S OFFICE, supra note 39 (providing links to settle-
ment agreements with various insurance companies).
198. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. R
199. See Scism & Vara, supra note 6. R
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existed, the funds likely would have already been claimed.200  As dis-
cussed earlier, unclaimed funds held by the state that are later claimed
by the beneficiary are sometimes payable without interest.201  If the
funds remain with the insurer pending proper documentation of the
insured’s death, those funds are generally required to be paid to benefi-
ciaries with interest.202  As a result, in some states, consumers are actu-
ally worse off with the state as custodian than if an insurer holds the
funds in a retained assets account.203
V. CONCLUSION
Our findings suggest that the downsides of retroactive application
of unclaimed life insurance legislation—though presumably well inten-
tioned—outweigh the upsides for consumers and insurance markets
alike.  Further, prospectively applicable legislation stands on firmer
ground from legal and policy perspectives.  Taking into account settled
expectations, data deficiencies, and the practical realities of the insur-
ance business, retroactive legislation becomes an even less attractive
solution.  Finally, remaining fiscal upsides for states in terms of reve-
nues available through retroactive legislation are limited.
Based on our analysis, we provide the following policy recommen-
dations.  Given the regulatory structure that insurers have operated
under and the enhanced data collection and analysis capabilities that
insurers now have, we believe it is reasonable to require insurers to
comply with DMF search requirements on a prospective basis.  In addi-
tion to legal presumptions against retroactive legislation, prospective
application would also provide fair notice, allowing insurers to assure
their data collection procedures reflect the unique requirements posed
by searches utilizing the DMF.  We believe that a prospective-only focus
would allow all insurers—particularly small and medium-sized insur-
ers—to adjust to these requirements without significant adverse disrup-
tions to the insurance market or significant adverse impacts on
consumers.204
200. Issues related to unclaimed death benefits are less problematic for legislation
that is prospective-only, as data collection is much better today and can be enhanced as
necessary going forward. See supra Part III.A.
201. See supra notes 116–117 and accompanying text. R
202. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. R
203. See supra notes 118–120 and accompanying text. R
204. To avoid confusion and reduce the likelihood of litigation, legislators could
consider making unclaimed life insurance statutes expressly prospective. Though silence
on applicability generally equates to a presumption against retroactive applicability, statu-
tory language that is expressly “prospective-only” could provide additional clarity and cer-
tainty on the question of enforcement and application.
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